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Purging Religion from Prisons:
The Constitutionality of the Standardized Chapel Library
Project
Andrew Lincoln*

INTRODUCTION

The First Amendment serves not only the needs of
the polity but also those of the human spirit-a
spirit that demands
self-expression.
Such
expression is an integral part of the development of
ideas and a sense of identity. To suppress
expression is to reject the basic human desire for
recognition and affront the individual's worth and
dignity. If anything, the needs for identity and selfrespect are more compelling in the dehumanizing
prison environment.'
Of the myriad challenges brought by prisoners against prison
regulations each year, 2 perhaps one of the most fundamentally important
in the context of First Amendment protections is the prisoners' challenge
to the Standardized Chapel Library Project (SCLP) in Milstein v. Federal
Bureau of Prisons.3 The SCLP came to fruition in March of 2003, when
several members of the United States Senate expressed discontent that
the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) procedure for selecting Muslim chaplains
did not adequately account for potential extremist views. Following that

Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina
School of Law, 2009.
1. Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the FirstAmendment, 72

YALE L.J. 877, 879-80 (1963).
2. Greene v. Solano County Jail, 513 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008); Johnson v.
Evinger, --- F.3d .... 2008 WL 313195 (7th Cir. 2008); Shakur v. Schriro, --- F.3d --- ,

2008 WL 185496 (9th Cir. 2008).

3. Complaint at 9, Milstein et al v. Federal Bureau of Prisons et al, No. 07CV7434 (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 21, 2007).
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criticism, the Inspector General filed a report, A Review of the Federal
Bureau of Prisons' Selection of Muslim Religious Services Providers, in
which the Inspector General cited problems in the BOP selection process
for Muslim religious services providers.4 Additionally, the Report was
critical of the BOP's supervision of chapel libraries. The Report found
that BOP Institutions failed to maintain inventories of the books and
5
videos in the libraries, and that it did not properly screen the materials.
It noted that
none of the library collections had been re-screened
since the September 11 terrorist attacks. The
Inspector General's office was told by one Muslim
chaplain that not all religious materials that had
come into BOP institutions are being screened by
6
the BOP's chaplains.
In response, the Inspector General recommended that the BOP
undertake an inventory of its chapel libraries, screen them for security
reasons, and create a central list of approved books to facilitate the
7
screening process.
This decision by the BOP has removed hundreds of Christian
books, including hymnals and well-known religious titles such as The
Purpose-Driven Life by Reverend Rick Warren. The ban has also
removed hundreds of Jewish books, including such fundamental works
as Maimonides' Code of Jewish Law and the Zohar, which is the central
text for Jewish mysticism. Quite possibly the largest reduction took
place with respect to Muslim texts, an already small section. The BOP
has removed Muslim prayer books, guides, and even the Hadith, which is
the primary source for Muslim practice following the Koran. In Otisville
Federal Prison, where the plaintiffs were held, the chapel library now
contains only the Koran and two other titles.8

4. Id.
5. Id.
6.

Office of the Inspector General, A Review of the Federal Bureau of

Prisons' Selection of Muslim Religious Services Providers (2004) at 41. Available

at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0404/final.pdf.
7. Complaint at 9, Milsten et al v. Federal Bureau of Prisons et al, No. 07CV7434 (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 21, 2007).
8. Id. at 3.
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The Supreme Court's struggle to balance the rights of prisoners
with ever-increasing security concerns in the prison system has led to a
sharp dichotomy in its jurisprudence, in which the outcome of a
constitutional challenge by a prisoner is almost exclusively tied to which
fundamental right is at stake. If it goes to the Supreme Court, the
Milstein case will test the proposition that the outcome of a First
Amendment challenge can be determined by the Court's characterization
of the fundamental right at issue. In other words, within the prison walls,
where freedom of speech is readily sacrificed in the name of security,
and religious expression as of late appears virtually untouchable, the
Court must categorize SCLP and decide whether the systematic purge of
religious texts from chapel libraries will or will not stand in the face of
the Free Exercise Clause.
The Milstein case is pending in the Southern District of New
York. 9 The challenge was brought by two inmates in the federal prison
camp in Otisville, New York, where hundreds of religious books were
suddenly removed from the shelves of the chapel library on Memorial
Day. Under SCLP, the Bureau of Prisons has banned and removed all
religious books and audio-visual media from its chapel libraries that do
not appear on a list of pre-approved materials. The removal of these
materials, occurring across the nation's federal prison system, is part of a
post-September 11th federal directive to stem the amount of radical
religious texts in prison libraries to prevent them from fostering violence
and religious fundamentalism within the prisons.l°
The plaintiffs brought this class action claiming that SCLP
deprives them of their religious freedoms as guaranteed under the First
Amendment. They allege that the government has "systematically
dismembered the chapel libraries ... that are at the heart of the BOP's
obligation to accommodate inmates' religious practices and beliefs...
which are now substantially burdened." 1 The baseline for the complaint
is 28 C.F.R. § 548(a) and the BOP policy publication P5360.09 (Program
Statement on Religious Beliefs and Practices), which requires BOP to
9. Milstein et al v. Federal Bureau of Prisons et al, No. 07-CV7434 (S.D.N.Y.
filed Aug. 21, 2007).
10. Associated Press, N.Y Prisoners Sue After Books Pulled From Chapel
Library, FIRSTAMENDMENTCENTER.ORG, June 6, 2007, available at http://www.first

amendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id= 18659.
11. Complaint, supra note 3, at 1.
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"provide[] inmates of all faith groups with the reasonable and equitable
opportunities to pursue religious belief and practices ....
This Note analyzes the potential First Amendment claims of
inmates challenging the SCLP under both the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act13 (RLUIPA) and the Free Exercise
Clause. 14 Part I describes how the Court has treated free exercise claims
by prisoners, specifically in light of its recent decision in Cutter v.
Wilkinson.1 5 Part II describes the Court's jurisprudence with regard to
other, secular claims brought by prisoners, discussing the Court's
continued deference to prison administrators in such cases. Part III
analyzes the implications of Cutter, examining whether the decision
indicates the Court's opinion that the Free Exercise Clause is in a
"preferred position" among other fundamental rights. Finally, Part IV
discusses the constitutionality of SCLP and evaluates the prisoners'
chance for success in the Supreme Court.
If taken to the Supreme Court, the decision in the Milstein case
will likely turn on whether the regulation is seen as a restriction on the
right of free exercise or one more secular in nature. In light of Cutter,
and given the religious nature of the issues at stake in the pending case,
the removal of religious texts from prison chapel libraries will likely be
adjudged to violate both RLUIPA and the Free Exercise Clause, as an
unconstitutional religious restriction.
I. FREE EXERCISE CHALLENGES TO PRISON REGULATIONS

The initial difficulty in dealing with issues relevant to
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is that many of them are contextspecific and wax and wane in importance with the composition of the
Court.! 6 For purposes of discussion, this Note will focus on a relatively

12. Id. at 6 (alteration added).
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2000cc-5 (2000).
14. It is important to note initially as a procedural matter that the inmates have
also now exhausted their administrative appeals within the prison system, which was
the main concern of the court when it initially ruled that the case was filed
prematurely.
15. 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
16. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508
U.S. 384 (1993). Justice Scalia's quote from the case embodies that difficulty in
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narrow portion of Court decisions to set the groundwork for more recent
decisions and federal statutes.
While the protections of the
Establishment Clause suffered a substantial setback in Employment
Division v. Smith, 17 they are now enjoying a new resurgence in the wake
of the Supreme Court's decision in Cutter v. Wilkinson.18 Steven
Goldberg 19 has pointed out that the Cutter Court "did not use any of its
numerous approaches to the Establishment Clause., 20 Instead, it simply
held that when Congress accommodated the religious practices of
inmates, it did not violate the Establishment Clause because Congress
was furthering free exercise values. 21
In Professor Goldberg's
estimation, this accommodation went far beyond the legislative
accommodations previously upheld by the Court. 22 It is perhaps a signal
that Justice O'Connor's position that "[t]he compelling [state] interest
test effectuates the First Amendment's command that religious
liberty... occupies a preferred position" 23 has become solidified now
more than ever in the evolution of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
A. The Evolution of Prisoners' Rights Jurisprudence

Before turning to recent Court decisions in the realm of
prisoners' rights, it is first necessary to lay the groundwork for how that
jurisprudence developed. It is worth noting at the outset that most recent
application when writing, "As to the Court's invocation of the Lemon test: Like
some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and
shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our
Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and
school attorneys ..... Id. at 398 (Scalia, J., concurring).
17. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (upholding a state law of general applicability
criminalizing peyote use, which led to the denial of unemployment benefits to
Native Americans, who lost their jobs due to peyote use).
18. 544 U.S. 709 (2005).

19. Professor Goldberg, in addition to his post as a Professor at Georgetown
University Law School, is a noted scholar in both constitutional law and religious
studies.
20. Steven Goldberg, Cutter and the PreferredPosition of the Free Exercise
Clause, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1403 (2006).

21. Id. at 1404.
22. Id.
23. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 895 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(alterations added).
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restrictions that have been upheld in the prison system were born
primarily out of a security rationale and are generally non-religious in
nature.24 Historically, prisoners' rights were severely restricted, and the
Court S•adhered
to a hands-off position when deferring to prison officials'
25
opinion. In effectuating this position, the courts generally deferred to
26
prison officials' decisions that burdened inmates' free exercise rights.
However, in cases such as Cruz v. Beto, 27 the Court began to
allow a gradual erosion of the hands-off position. In Cruz, the prison
prevented the plaintiff from borrowing or lending Buddhist religious
books and materials and punished him by placement in solitary
confinement on a diet of bread and water for two weeks for sharing his
Buddhist religious materials with other prisoners. While noting the
security rationale in the prison context, the Court held that reasonable
opportunities must be afforded to all prisoners to exercise the religious
freedom guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments without
28
fear of penalty.
Similarly, in Bell v. Wolfish, 29 the Court applied a deferential
rational relationship standard and concluded that the Publishers-Only

24. See West v. Frank, 492 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (W.D. Wis. 2007); Pryor v. Dep't
of Corr., 395 N.J. Super. 471, 929 A.2d 1091 (N.J. Super. App. Ct. Div. 2007),
Brown v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 932 A.2d 316 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2007).
25. See generally Lorijean Golichowski Dei, The New Standard of Review for
Prisoners' Rights: A "Turner" for the Worse?, 33 VILL. L. REv. 393, 399 (1988)
(explaining the development of case law dealing with prisoners' rights and
describing the hands-off position used by the courts). The hands-off position
described the courts' near-absolute deference to prison officials that continued until
the 1960s. Id.
26. The central rationales offered to support the hands-off approach were: (1)
the perceived propriety of deferring to the prison officials' expertise; and (2)
federalism issues that could arise if federal courts intervened in controversies
between state prisoners and state prisons. Roberta M. Harding, In the Belly of the
Beast: A Comparison of the Evolution and Status of Prisoners'Rights in the United
States and Europe, 27 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 9-10 (1998).
27. 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). The Court signaled the end of the hands-off
position when it said that while it is not the duty of the federal courts to supervise
prisons, it is the duty of the courts to enforce the constitutional rights of all persons,
including prisoners. Id. at 321.
28. Id.at 322.
29. 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979).
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Rule did not violate the First Amendment rights of the inmate. 30 Simply
put, the Publishers-Only Rule stands for the proposition that inmates are
prohibited from receiving hardcover books unless the books were mailed
directly by the publishers or book clubs, thereby diminishing the
possibility of contraband. 31 The central reasoning in Wolfish was that the
prison regulation was "a rational response by prison officials to an
obvious security problem., 32 Again, even though the Court did
acknowledge and ultimately defer to the prison administrators' security
concerns, the opinion was characterized more by a thorough analysis of
the importance of prisoners' rights than mere platitudes about
institutional needs.
The Supreme Court eventually articulated a bright-line rule to
determine prisoners' free exercise claims in Turner v. Safley. 33 In
Turner, the Court crafted a test for reviewing prisoners' constitutional
claims, with an eye toward balancing the need to protect prisoners'
constitutional rights with the desire to refrain from intruding upon prison
administrators' ability to perform their jobs effectively.34 Under this
rational basis standard, courts will uphold a law if it is rationally related
to a legitimate government purpose. 35 Thereafter, the Court established a
four-factor analysis to determine whether a regulation that burdened a
prisoner's fundamental rights was reasonable: (1) whether there is a
"valid, rational connection" between a prison regulation and a legitimate
government interest; (2) whether there are alternative means available to
the prisoner to exercise that right; (3) the impact of accommodating the
religious right on prison resources, guards and other inmates; and (4)
36
When
whether there are alternatives to the regulation in question.
30. Id. One of the challenged prison regulations in Bell prohibited inmates
from receiving hardcover books unless the books were mailed directly by the
at 528.
publishers or book clubs. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.at 550.
33. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
34. Id.(noting that when the Court developed a test for adjudicating prisoners'
constitutional claims, it considered both the difficulties of prison administration, and
the importance of individual freedom).
35. See Guerra v. Scruggs, 942 F.2d 270, 279 (4th Cir. 1991) (stating that the
rational basis test is more deferential to the government).
36. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90 (noting that the Court chose to apply a
rational basis analysis instead of strict scrutiny).
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applying this test, courts generally give significant deference to prison
administrators and are unlikely to interfere with the internal
administrations of prisons because the judiciary does not want to hinder
important penological objectives.3 7 Moreover, courts are normally wary
of the possibility of judicial interference undermining prison security and
therefore accord officials a great deal of deference when security
regulations are enforced. 38 Therefore, the foundation for prisoners'
rights, First Amendment or otherwise, seemed squarely in favor of prison
administrators and the interests of security.
B. RFRA & RLUIPA: The Battle between Congress and the Court
This progression from the hands-off position to a rational basis
standard in turn was followed by the decision in Employment Division v.
Smith, 39 which gave life to the new constitutional struggle between
Congress and the Supreme Court. Congress' decision to enact the
Religious Freedom and Restoration Act 40 ("RFRA") was in response to
the decision in Smith, in which the Court held that the Constitution does
not require the application of a strict scrutiny standard
to laws of general
S• 41
applicability that burden free exercise of religion. The fallout from the
holding in Smith was the impetus for Congress to pass RFRA and
eventually its successor, RLUIPA. Consequently, RFRA and RLUIPA
both apply a strict scrutiny standard to claims regarding religious rights,
42
which is a higher standard than previously available under Turner.

37. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995) (holding that courts
should defer to prison and state officials who must cope with the explosive
environment of penal institutions).
38. See generally Overston v. Bazzetta 539 U.S. 126 (2003) (holding that
courts must accord substantial deference to the professional judgment of prison
administrators, who bear a significant responsibility for defining the legitimate goals
of a corrections system and for determining the most appropriate means to
accomplish them).
39. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
40. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
41. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (upholding a
state law of general applicability criminalizing religious peyote use).
42. See 146 CONG. REc. S7774-01 (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and
Kennedy) (2000) (stating that the purpose of RLUIPA was to re-enact the strict
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RFRA prohibited federal and state governments from
substantially burdening the free exercise of religion unless the
government could show that the burden furthered a compelling
43
government interest and was the least restrictive means of doing so.
The existence of RFRA was short-lived, however, as the Court struck
down the statute in City of Boerne v. Flores" on the grounds that
Congress exceeded its enforcement powers under the Fourteenth
Amendment.4 5 The majority concluded that RFRA went beyond merely
constitutional rights
remedying constitutional violations, instead granting
46
in violation of the separation of powers doctrine.
In response to Flores, Congress enacted RLUIPA, which was
designed to narrow the focus of RFRA's standard of strict scrutiny to be
applicable in only two areas: land-use regulation and persons in
This move by Congress was based largely on
institutions.47
congressional hearings, which concluded that inmates were often subject
to regulations at the whim of prison officials that imposed arbitrary rules
regarding the right to practice religion.48 In shaping the legislation,
Congress relied on Senate Judiciary Committee reports on RFRA, which
49
concluded that RFRA did not unreasonably burden the prison system.
Presumably, then, the struggle as to the fate of prisoners' rights was

scrutiny standard of RFRA and apply it to institutionalized persons and land use
regulations).
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2005) (stating that the compelling interest test is
appropriate for striking a balance between religious liberty and government
interests).
44. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
45. See id. (holding RFRA unconstitutional pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment in a case involving the Archbishop of San Antonio's challenge, under
RFRA, to a local zoning authority's denial of a building permit).
46. See id. (explaining that RFRA's flaw was the attempt to change
constitutional protections substantially by prohibiting state conduct that the
Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit).
47. See RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(a) (2005) (explaining that RLUIPA's
language, which is identical to RFRA's, prohibits the government from placing a
burden on religious exercise unless that burden furthers a "compelling" government
interest and is the "least restrictive" means of doing so).
48. See 146 CONG. REc. S7774-01, S7775 (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and
Kennedy) (explaining that prisoners are often exposed to religious discrimination).
49. See id. (stating that prisoners are in an extremely vulnerable position
because their religious rights are in the hands of one or a few local officials).
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undecided given Congress' desire to expand rights of religious
expression and the Court's previous reluctance to allow an elevation of
religion.
C. Cutter v. Wilkinson: The "Establishment"of RL UIPA
Prior to the Court's decision in Cutter, the future of RLUIPA
was far from certain. In enacting RLUIPA, Congress was certainly
cognizant of the Court's sometimes haphazard application of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence and unwillingness to place religious
expression over other fundamental rights. The focal point of contention
as to RLUIPA's constitutionality came in the form of a circuit split, with
the Sixth Circuit as the sole objector to RLUIPA. In November 2003, a
panel of the Sixth Circuit held that RLUIPA violated the Establishment
Clause under the test set forth by the Supreme Court in Lemon v.
Kurtzman.
The court ruled that while RLUIPA's purported purpose
was to advance, not accommodate religion, in practice, it favored
religious expression over other "fundamental rights., 5 1 RLUIPA was
given a decidedly warmer reception in the Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits, where Establishment Clause challenges were rejected, holding
that RLUIPA has a legitimate and secular purpose and that the statute did
not grant more rights to religious inmates. 2 This dissension in the
50. 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). The three prongs from the "Lemon Test" are as
follows: (1) the government's action must have a legitimate secular purpose; (2) the
government's action must not have the primary effect of either advancing or
inhibiting religion; and (3) the government's action must not result in an "excessive
government entanglement" with religion. If any of these three prongs is violated, the
government's action is deemed unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment.
51. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, 265, 268-69 (6th Cir. 2003), rev'd,
544 U.S. 709 (2005) (stating that the Sixth Circuit based its decision that RLUIPA
violates the Establishment Clause on the Supreme Court's test for adjudicating
Establishment Clause challenges, set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman); see also Lemon,
403 U.S. at 612 (establishing a three-prong test, which is still the prevailing method
to determine whether a statute complies with the Establishment Clause).
52. See Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2002)
(concluding that, under RLUIPA, prison officials could not bar Muslim inmates
from attending Friday prayer sessions); Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601, 611 (7th
Cir. 2003) (upholding a Muslim inmate's right to access prayer oil while
incarcerated); Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310, 317-19 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that

322

FIRST AMENDMENT LA W RE VIEW

rvol. 6

circuits led the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in order to decide the
fate of RFRA's contentious successor. If the constitutionality of
RLUIPA and the tacit supremacy of the Free Exercise Clause were in
question, it was certainly answered with the Supreme Court's decision in
Cutterv. Wilkinson.
In Cutter, followers of Asatru, a polytheistic Viking religion, a
white supremacist preacher, and a practicing witch jointly filed suit
pursuant to RLUIPA. 53 They claimed that the Ohio Department of
Corrections (ODOC) denied them their freedom to conform their
appearance to the requirements of their religions, denied them a prison
chaplain trained in their religions, and denied them access to religious
literature.54 While the plaintiffs asserted that their religious practices
posed no security threats to the prison, the ODOC admitted that it had
refused to allow a number of the plaintiffs' religious requests, and argued
that the restrictions were essential in light of the fact that some aspects of
the religious practices threatened prison security.55 Operating under the
assumption that a simple Turner and Lemon application was controlling
and the security rationale was at least plausible, it would seem reasonable
to expect the Court to defer to those more experienced in the field of
prison administration.
In Cutter however, the Court upheld RLUIPA, which prevented
prison administrators from burdening an inmate's religious rights unless
the burden furthered "a compelling governmental interest" and did so by

prison administrators violated RLUIPA when they denied a Jewish prisoner kosher
meals).
53. See Cutter, 349 F.3d at 260 (6th Cir. 2003), rev'd, 544 U.S. 709 (2005)
(noting that the Sixth Circuit consolidated three cases in Cutter for the purpose of
deciding the Ohio Department of Correction's challenge to RLUIPA: Gerhardt v.
Lazaroff, Case No. C2-95-517; Hampton v. Wilkinson, Case No. C2-98-275; and
Miller v. Wilkinson, Case No. C2-97-382).
54. See Gerhardt v. Lazaroff, 221 F. Supp. 2d 827, 832-33 (S.D. Ohio 2002)
(stating that the plaintiffs originally brought their claims under the rational basis
standard of Turner v. Safley), rev'd sub nom., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709
(2005). After the enactment of RLUIPA, the plaintiffs amended their complaints to
argue that the more restrictive standards in RLUIPA applied to the Department's

actions. Id.
55. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) (explaining that the defendants
claimed, for example, that investigators linked the practice of Asatru to a 1993 riot at
the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility).
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"the least restrictive means."'56 In a unanimous decision authored by
Justice Ginsburg, the Court reversed the opinion of the Sixth Circuit on
several grounds.57 First, the Court held that the statute's institutionalized
persons provision is not violative of the Establishment Clause because it
merely alleviates "government created" burdens on prisoners' religious
expression and is a lawful accommodation of religion. 58 The Court also
explained that RLUIPA does not run afoul of the Establishment Clause
because it stops short of differentiating between specific religions.59
Although the Court explicitly ruled that under the statute, inmates would
be allowed to "assemble for worship, but not for political rallies, 6 ° the
holding rejected the Sixth Circuit's reasoning that RLUIPA
impermissibly advanced religion by affording it greater protection than
other constitutionally protected rights.6 ' In doing so, the decision
emphasized that the Constitution does not mandate that all constitutional
rights receive legislative protections in the same manner. 62 This is the
first indication that, in the Court's reasoning, religious expression and
accommodation thereof might enjoy a privileged status in federal
prisons. It is significantly telling in the context of the evolution of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence that Justice Ginsburg chose not to
apply Lemon, as the Sixth Circuit had. Justice Thomas also hinted at a
potentially new privileged status for reviewing restrictions on religion in
the prison context when referring to the otherwise
controlling precedent
' 63
Kurtzman.
v.
Lemon
in
test
discredited
as "the

56. Id. at 714, 719-20.
57. Seeid. at711.

58. See id.The Court chose not to decide Cutterunder the Lemon analysis, on
which the Sixth Circuit relied in shaping its holding. Id.at 718.

59. See id.
at 723-24 (stating that the Supreme Court had previously struck
down a statute that created a separate school district solely for a particular sect of
Orthodox Jews).
60. Id.at 724-25.
61. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 710-11 (2005) (reaffirming the
Court's decision in Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987)).
62. See id.
at 724 (citing Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir. 2003))
(noting that the mere fact that RLUIPA seeks to lift government burdens on a
prisoner's religious exercise does not mean that the statute is also required to provide
commensurate protections for other fundamental rights).
63. See id.
at 727, n. 1 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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With the Establishment Clause issue of the challenge largely
settled, the Court next turned to the security concerns of prison officials,
a group to which the Court traditionally has afforded a substantial
amount of deference. As it had ruled in the past, the Court reaffirmed
that prison security is a compelling state interest, and that prison officials
warrant deference in maintaining safety. 64 Nevertheless, in emphasizing
that RLUIPA does not place the need to accommodate prisoners'
religious rights above prison order and security, the Court examined the
legislative history behind the statute and found that Congress was
mindful of the need for65 prison safety and efficiency while debating and
drafting the legislation.
One of the main criticisms leveled generally against RLUIPA
was the assertion that prisoners would take advantage of the statute and
its protections by claiming false religious beliefs, thereby unnecessarily
burdening the prison system with administrative work it was not
66
designed to handle. In response, as a safety valve, the Court accounted
for this contingency by leaving open the possibility that if too many
burdens were imposed on prison officials in the form of excessive
religious accommodation requests by inmates, new challenges to the
67
Through this holding, the Court gave
statute would be considered.
prisoners a powerful weapon to wield against a prison official's attempt
to burden religious expression. However, as in the aftermath of other
landmark cases, the true test remained as to how lower courts would
interpret and apply this newly minted judicial view of religious exercise.
D. Response to Cutter

The broad scope of the Cutter decision and the resulting victory
for religious exercise has been further solidified in cases argued and
decided post-Cutter. In fact, the overwhelming trend across the country
64. See id. at 724, n.13 (noting that deference is due to institutional officials'
expertise in this area).
65. See 139 CONG. REc. 26190, S14350, S14364 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993)
(remarks of Sen. Hatch) (expecting that courts would apply RLUIPA with due
deference to the expertise of prison administrators).
66. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 725-26.
67. Id. at 726 (explaining that the Court did not foresee abusive prisoner
litigation or excessive burdens on prison administrators).
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has been to uphold religious challenges under RLUIPA while generally
68
The
affording markedly less sweeping deference to prison officials.
first such example came just two months after Cutter, when the Ninth
Circuit reversed a decision made pre-Cutter and upheld an inmate's
religious right to wear his hair at a length longer than sanctioned under
69
prison regulations. In December of 2006, the Fourth Circuit followed
suit in Lovelace v. Lee 70 when it upheld a religious challenge brought
71
pursuant to RLUIPA. In Lovelace, a Muslim inmate was disqualified
from participation in one religious exercise (the fast), which meant that
all other avenues for worship (group exercise and prayer) automatically
became unavailable to him under prison regulations. The Fourth Circuit
held that the removal of a prisoner from the Ramadan observance pass
list was an imposition of "substantial burden" within the meaning of
RLUIPA. 72 The court also found that prison officials did not fulfill their
burden of showing that their policies were the least restrictive means of
furthering a compelling government interest, as is required for policies to
conform with RLUIPA.7 3
In a further showing of Cutter's more recent resilience, the First
Circuit reversed and remanded a lower court decision in Spratt v. Rhode
Island Dep't of Corr.7 4 The holding acknowledged that there were
questions as to whether the Department's policy of a general prohibition
of inmates preaching to fellow inmates furthered the compelling interest
in prison security, and further, that the department could not satisfy
RLUIPA's "least restrictive means" requirement by making a blanket

68. See Spratt v. Rhode Island Dep't of Corr., 482 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2007);
Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 2006); Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d

989 (9th Cir. 2005).
69. Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that
restriction on a Cahuilla Native American's religious belief about cutting his hair
only in the event of the death of a family member was a violation of RLUIPA).
70. 472 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 2006).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 187 (noting that a substantial burden on religious exercise occurs
when a state or local government, through act or omission, "put[s] substantial
pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs" (quoting
Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981))
(alteration added)).
73. Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 191.
74. 482 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2007).

326

FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 6

statement that all alternatives had been considered and rejected. 75 These
cases stand as just three powerful indicators of Cutter's staying power
and broad judicial acceptance of Congress' intent to elevate the Free
Exercise Clause in the prison system.
II. SECULAR CHALLENGES TO PRISON REGULATIONS

Part I identified a trend in cases that support the proposition that
the Free Exercise Clause commands a preferred position in the Court's
estimation. In Part II, this Note shows how other fundamental rights
such as free speech do not easily elicit such protections in the prison
context. The Supreme Court developed a framework under Turner to
review secular First Amendment challenges, keeping in mind both the
importance of prison security and the preservation of some constitutional
rights that inmates retain. The recent ruling in Beard v. Banks76 brought
to the forefront the issue of why the Court continues to bow to more
regulations of a secular, non-religious nature.
Before turning to Banks, however, it is first helpful to examine
its predecessors, which opened the door for allowing more sustained
deprivations of prisoners' rights. Courts during that time readily
accepted that prison officials were experts in their field and were more
77
knowledgeable about supervising inmates and prisons than judges.
Beginning with Pell v. Procunier, the Court began to place more stock
in the idea of alternative means of expression. In Procunier, the
Supreme Court dealt with prisoners' claims that regulations prohibiting
them from having access to face-to-face media interviews amounted to
an unlawful restriction on their freedom of expression.79 The Court first
reasoned that limiting visits from strangers was clearly related to

75. Id. at 41 (noting that a prison "cannot meet its burden to prove least
restrictive means unless it demonstrates that it has actually considered and rejected
the efficacy of less restrictive measures before adopting the challenged practice"
(quoting Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 999 (9th Cir. 2005))).
76. 126 S. Ct. 2572 (2006).
77. See Kendrick v. Bland, 659 F. Supp. 1188, 1195-96 (W.D. Ky. 1987)
(determining that trained prison administrators can resolve problems more
effectively than judges).
78. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
79. Id.
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important governmental interests of prison safety, deterrence of crime,
and rehabilitation.
Next, the Court explained that the limitation of
expression in these interviews should not be analyzed in an isolated
context, but instead viewed in connection with possible alternative forms
81
Yet again, in deferring strongly to prison
of expression available.
officials and recognizing alternatives, the majority held that security
considerations are sufficiently paramount to justify the imposition of
some restrictions on "fundamental" rights.82
In 1987, an important shift occurred in the Court's analysis of
First Amendment challenges pursuant to the holding in Turner, which
For the most part,
effectively replaced the Procunier framework.
however, the application of the Turner four-factor test 83 did not change
the fortunes of inmates' challenges on First Amendment grounds. In
Thornburgh v. Abbot, an inmate challenged prison restrictions on
incoming publications for inmates. 84 Under Federal Bureau of Prisons
85

prison officials were authorized to reject incoming
regulations,
publications if they were deemed to be "detrimental to the security, good
order, or discipline of the institution or if they might facilitate criminal
,,86
activity.
Stressing that Turner involved applying the Turner factors
and deference to prison officials, the Court again sided with prison
officials and explained that the administrators were better-suited to
87
determine which publications might create upset amongst inmates.
Consequently, the Court viewed the restrictions as legitimately
connected to the goal of prison security and rationally related to the
88
As in Procunier,
proffered objection of maintaining order and safety.
and as will be described in greater detail later in relation to the Milstein
case, the Court found that alternative means for expression remained

80. Id.at 822-23.
81. Id.at 831-32.
82. Id.at 823.
83. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987).
84. 490 U.S. 401 (1989).
85. 28 C.F.R. § 540.71 (2008).
86. Id.at 403 n.1. Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 540.71 (2007), wardens may reject
books, single issues of magazines or newspapers, or other print materials based on
the objective of enforcing security and order, and suppressing criminal activity.
87. 490 U.S. at 413.
88. Id.at 414-15.
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open, thereby providing grounds on which to uphold the restriction.
Essentially, these cases illustrate that where there is a rational security
interest proffered by prison officials against a secular challenge,
application of Turner will almost always lead to upholding the
restriction.
A. Beard v. Banks Deference

The reasoning employed by the Court in Banks does well to
solidify the hypothesis that non-religious restrictions on First
Amendment rights are more easily circumscribed in prisons. The
collective precedent of Procunier and the Turner factors were both
before the Court when they handed down their decision in Beard v.
Banks. In Banks, inmates located in the "most restrictive level" of a
Pennsylvania prison were denied access to magazines, personal
photographs, and newspapers. All inmates in the prison were initially
placed in this most restrictive level and therefore deprived of access to
these items on arrival. 9' Although some inmates did eventually manage
to progress into less restrictive areas of the prison, "in practice most [did]
,,92
not.
In examining the prison officials' justification for the restriction,
the Court relied heavily on the Pennsylvania Prison Secretary's assertion
that deprivation was necessary "to motivate better behavior on the part of
[these] particularly difficult prisoners, by providing them with an
incentive"93 to move to a lower level in the prison, and to "discourage
backsliding. 9 4 Following an analysis of the Turner factors, the Court
found a rational relationship between the goal of prisoner safety and
rehabilitation and approved the resulting restrictions on reading materials
and personal photographs.95

89. Id.at 417-18.
90. Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2575 (2006).
91. Id.at 2576.
92. Id. (alteration added).
93. Id.at 2579 (quoting Prison Secretary Dickson's deposition).
94. Id.at 2579 (citing Brief of Appellant at 26, Beard v. Banks, 126 S.Ct.
2572 (2006)).
95. Id.at 2574.
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Some have argued that the Court's decision in Banks is
96
Turner factors.
tantamount to an abdication of faithfully applying the
In a recent article, Anna Burns offers that the Court "manipulated Turner
to reach its desired outcome, and rolled over, leaving room for the great
possibility that any fundamental right could be acceptably denied if
justified by rehabilitation., 97 Although this approach is arguably cynical,
the analysis may merit well-deserved credibility as other "fundamental
rights" are restricted and challenged. In any event, it is clear that Banks'
progeny bespeak the fact that most secular restrictions in the prison
system, under a security rationale, and where alternatives are available,
will be upheld.
B. Post-Banks Decisions
Just as the application of Cutter has been largely consistent in
favor of protections of religious expression following the decision, Banks
has unfailingly served as the basis for several subsequent decisions in the
secular prison context. Shortly after Banks was handed down, the Tenth
v. Duncan.98
Circuit applied the decision in deciding the case of Wardell
The challenge involved an inmate alleging that a prison policy requiring
prisoners to purchase all hobby materials, legal materials, books, and
magazines from their prison accounts, and prohibiting gifts to prisoners
of such materials from unauthorized sources, violated prisoners' First
Amendment rights. The court held that the inmate's claim of a right to
receive mail was properly dismissed where the prison officials asserted
and substantiated a set of legitimate penological interests rationally
related to the restrictions.99 In so finding, the court emphasized the
second Turner factor to bolster the conclusion that the challenged
restriction was a constitutionally valid exercise 0 0of prison officials'
authority because alternative means were available.'

96. See, e.g., Anna C. Bums, Beard v. Banks: Restricted Reading,
Rehabilitation, and Prisoners' First Amendment Rights, 15 J.L. & POL'Y 1225
(2007).
97. Id. at 1269.
98. 470 F.3d 954 (10th Cir. 2006).
99. Id.at 963.
100. Wardell, 470 F.3d at 962.
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In one of the most recent applications of the Turner test
following Banks in the non-religious framework of jurisprudence, the
Court in Ramirez v. Pugh101 dealt with an inmate at a federal minimum
security correctional facility who brought an action claiming that a
statute banning the use of federal funds to distribute certain sexually
explicit material to prisoners violated his First Amendment right to free
speech. In applying the four factors and deferring to prison officials'
testimony, the district court accepted evidence that restricting access to
the materials at issue increased the chances for rehabilitation of sex
offenders.12 In light of the fact that the inmate could not establish a
ready alternative to the ban at de minimis cost to the valid penological
interest, the court held that the statute and accompanying regulations
were all "reasonably related to the legitimate penological goals of
rehabilitating sex offenders, rehabilitating other inmates, preserving
institutional security; and satisfied other requirements imposed by the
First Amendment."' 0 3 These recent decisions, all following from the
deferential Turner framework applied in Banks, seem to suggest that
while the Supreme Court is willing to quickly accept general restrictions
on some First Amendment rights in prisons, it is loath to extend the
scope of that deference to cases involving religion and the Free Exercise
Clause. How can this dichotomy be reconciled?
III. RELIGION'S PREFERRED POSITION

Author Steven Goldberg asserts that "under Cutter, religion has
achieved a special status it has not enjoyed in years, and this result can
be explained only by the Free Exercise Clause."' 0 4 He points out that
"this accommodation went far beyond the legislative accommodations
previously upheld by the Court. Without the Free Exercise Clause, the
result in Cutter would have been impossible."'' 0 5 As previously noted,
the Sixth Circuit found this to be the case, and it was precisely for that
reason that the court struck down RLUIPA under Lemon. In applying

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

486 F. Supp. 2d 421 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
Id. at 429.
Id.
Goldberg, supra note 20, at 1404 (2005).
Id.
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the Lemon test, the Sixth Circuit found that Congress had violated the
requirement that a statute not have the primary effect of advancing
Specifically, the court noted that Congress had
religion. 1 6
"impermissibly advance[ed] religion by giving greater protection to
religious rights than to other constitutionally protected rights," including
free speech. 10 So why has the Supreme Court sanctioned congressional
creation of a system in which inmates can "assemble for worship, but not
for political rallies"? °8 The answer is found in the Court's strong yet
arcane reasoning in Cutter.
In order to find the end result that RLUIPA did not violate the
Establishment Clause, the Court began by finessing a subtlety in the two
clauses at issue. Following an explanation that the Establishment and the
Free Exercise Clauses "exert conflicting pressures,"' 1 9 it found that there
was "room for play in the joints" between the two Clauses. 110 As Steven
Goldberg notes:
[S]ome government actions that favor religion, but
are not mandated by the Free Exercise Clause, are
nonetheless not in violation of the Establishment
Clause. RLUIPA's protection of inmate religious
practice fit into this space.
The Court further explained that Congress was accommodating
religion, yet it cited but a single case in which it had upheld a legislative
accommodation in the past.' 12 Although it is apparent that Cutter did not
necessarily follow from Amos, Goldberg explains that the Court used
Amos and "set forth a set of three considerations for deciding whether an
accommodation was lawful under the Establishment Clause: Did the
accommodation alleviate exceptional government-created burdens on

106. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, 264 (6th Cir. 2003), rev'd, 544 U.S.
709 (2005).
107. Id. (alteration added).
108. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 724-25 (2005) (quoting Reply Brief

for the United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioner at 5, Cutter v. Wilkinson,
544 U.S. 709 (2005) (No. 03-9877).
109. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 719.
110. Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)).
111. Goldberg, supra note 20, at 1408 (alteration added).
112. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720 (citing Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos,
483 U.S. 327, 349 (1987)).
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private religious exercise? Did it avoid unduly burdening
nonbeneficiaries? Was it neutral among different faiths?"" 3 Through
application of these factors in Cutter, the Court found that RLUIPA
satisfied all of them. The argument is a fair assessment of the case and
the issue as applied by the Court. If Amos was the only cited case and
did not necessarily mandate the outcome in Cutter, Professor Goldberg's
Establishment Clause analysis is a plausible alternative.
This is the heart of Goldberg's argument and it successfully
answers the important question of what medium religion used to gain this
preferred position above other fundamental rights-the Free Exercise
Clause."14 In light of that reasoning, the holding in Cutter is not that the
Free Exercise Clause constituted an affirmative grant of power to
Congress. 1 5 Goldberg finds that "[t]he holding is, rather, that the Free
Exercise Clause shapes the meaning of the Establishment Clause. It
be
otherwise
would
statutes
that
constitutional
makes
unconstitutional."' 16 In doing so, "[i]t pulls some legislation into a zone
of safety that otherwise would be crushed by the Establishment Clause."
117
By reading the position of the Free Exercise Clause this way, it
certainly supports the notion that the elevation of Free Exercise rights
through RLUIPA, which would previously have been struck down under
an Establishment Clause challenge, is playing out in the courts.
Therefore, the Cutter decision is so significant because this
suggestion that religion was a more fundamental right than free speech
was not always the case. As Goldberg makes clear, "until Cutter, the
Court had stressed that religious viewpoints could not be excluded when
the government extended benefits to political expression."" 8 In other
words, religion did not take a back seat to other essential rights, but it
also was never given the status that was accorded in Cutter.
Perhaps one of the clearest illustrations of this proposition is
found in the Supreme Court's 1993 decision in Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free School District,119 which dealt with a school
113. Goldberg, supra note 20, at 1409.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id. at 1410.
Id. (alteration added).
Id. (alteration added).
Id. at 1413.
508 U.S. 384 (1993).
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district's ruling that school premises were not to be used for religious
purposes. Petitioners requested use of school premises for a film series
concerning Christian family values by a licensed psychologist. The issue
was whether denying a church access to school premises for public
viewing of an allegedly religious film violated the Free Speech Clause of
the First Amendment. The Court reversed the denial of petitioners'
access to school property for public use because it was viewpoint-based
discrimination to permit school property to be used for the presentation
of all views about family issues and child rearing except those dealing
with the subject matter from a religious standpoint. 12 The reasoning and
fundamental message at the foundation of Lamb's Chapel is important
precisely
because
it continued to hold as the norm in pre-Cutter
•
•
121
jurisprudence.
The Third Circuit followed Lamb's Chapel in 2004 with Child
Evangelism Fellowship of NJ., Inc. v. Stafford School District,12 which
involved a New Jersey school board's decision to allow community
groups the opportunity to participate in the district's Back-to-School
Night. The Court affirmed the district court's decision that requires the
school district to treat the group the same as other community groups
with regard to the distribution and posting of literature concomitant with
the group's after school club and with regard to the opportunity to
display literature and to staff a table at the annual Back-to-School
night. 123 Finding that the district court correctly concluded that the group
was likely to succeed on its free speech claim and that the school district
was likely to fail in its argument that discrimination against the group
was necessary in order to comply with the Establishment Clause, the
Court concluded that the group's equal access to fora provided by the
school district to the broad spectrum of other community groups would

120. Id. at 395-97 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (holding
the challenged governmental action has a secular purpose, does not have the
principal or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and does not foster an
excessive entanglement with religion)).
121. See Rosenberg v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819
(1995) (holding that barring the religious group from a limited public forum was
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination that violated the Free Speech Clause).
122. 386 F.3d 514 (3d Cir. 2004).
123. Id. at 535-36.
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not result in an impermissible endorsement of religion.' 24 The Third
Circuit, in line with precedent and maintaining parity between religious
expression and free speech, ruled that an equal acknowledgement of the
rights was necessary. In light of these cases, Cutter stands as a
momentous, albeit perhaps arbitrary, break from a conscious judicial
choice to equally protect all fundamental rights.
In citing only Amos and departing from the relative equivalence
historically given to religion and other fundamental rights, the Cutter
Court ostensibly carved out a space to support accommodation of
religion. This proposition supports the notion that the Court acquiesced
to Congress in giving religious expression a preferred position in relation
to free speech or political expression. The Court in Cutter supported this
reasoning for allowing the religious accommodation and refusing others
by rejecting the respondent's argument that the statute advances religion
by encouraging prisoners to "get religion," and thereby gain
accommodations afforded under RLUIPA.125 In essence, the majority
opinion by Justice Ginsburg was careful to point out that the prison
system already gave religious expression more attention than other
rights. 26 The Court first focused on the federal government's decision to
provide chaplains in the military. 127 It then shifted to the prison system
and noted that Ohio, even pre-RLUIPA, had provided religious services
for mainstream faiths.128 The Court explained that, "[t]he State provides
inmates with chaplains 'but not with publicists or political
consultants."",129 In further support of this general proposition, the Court
made clear that Ohio did sometimes allow prisoners to gather for
religious services and pointed out that "[t]he State allows 'prisoners to

124. Id. at 534-35.
125. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 721 n.10 (2005) (providing a response
to the Respondent's notion that one effect of RLUIPA is that it encourages nonreligious prisoners to "get religion," thereby advancing religion in violation of the
Establishment Clause).
126. Id.
127. Goldberg, supra note 20, at 1411 (citing Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223,
225-229 (2d Cir. 1985) (describing the Army chaplaincy program)).
128. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 721 n.10.
129. Id. at 724-25 (quoting Reply Brief for the United States as Respondent
Supporting Petitioner at 5, Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) (No. 03-9877))
(alteration added).
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assemble for worship, but not for political rallies. -,130 However, the
Court, in citing Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.13 1 was careful to
address its finding that RLUIPA does not elevate accommodation of
32
religion over an institution's need to maintain order and security.'
Even taking these security interests into consideration, by elevating the
protection of religion in this way, and in light of Banks, the preferred
position of religious expression in prisons now seems almost selfevident.
The above referenced cases dealing with the application of
Cutter give credence to Professor Goldberg's conclusion that, "[t]he
most likely future is that Cutter will inaugurate a series of case-by-case
decisions in which the Court grapples with which accommodations of
religion to allow."' 33 The very nature of the flexibility that the Court
affords judicial review when examining restrictions on religious
expression in prisons, however, has tended to show that case-by-case
analysis more often than not leads to protection of inmates' religious
expression under the arguably expanding auspices of RLUIPA.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE STANDARDIZED CHAPEL LIBRARY
PROJECT

All questions about the possibility of an elevated position for
greater expression of religion in prisons will likely be answered if the
Supreme Court grants certiorari in the pending New York case.134 The
inmates allege claims under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the
First Amendment Free Exercise Clause, and the First Amendment Right
to Read and Access Information. 35 Generally speaking, the inmates
130. Id.(alteration added).

131. 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985) (holding a law invalid under the Establishment
Clause because it "unyielding[ly] weigh[ted]" the interests of Sabbatarians "over all
other interests") (alteration added).
132. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720-21.

133. Goldberg, supra note 20, at 1419 (alteration added).
134. Milstein et al v. Federal Bureau of Prisons et al, No. 07-CV7434
(S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 21, 2007).
135. Perhaps following the Court's decision in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507 (1997) that RFRA was an unconstitutional exercise of Congressional
power, there is still some vestige of the statute remaining that is not readily apparent.
In fact, some scholars believe RFRA still applies to federal acts (the U.S. Congress
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allege that the thousands of religious books and media removed from
prisons were necessary to learn about and practice their faiths. In a broad
stroke, they argue that the materials were removed absent any effort to
determine whether each book was inflammatory or extremist. In other
words, the inmates claim that the removal of these basic texts of various
faiths is not the "least restrictive means" of protecting a "compelling
government interest." By framing the complaint and claims along
religious expression lines, what could otherwise plausibly be a challenge
to a reduction of reading materials for inmates, becomes a burden on the
practice of faith.
At the heart of the government's contention is the claim that
prisons "had been radicalized by inmates who were practicing or
espousing various extreme forms of religion, which exposed security
36 To
risks to the prisons and beyond the prisons to the public at large."'
be sure, the position focuses on the fact that the restriction is on access to
information in the broader sense and under the pure security rationale.
Assistant U.S. Attorney Brian Feldman also quoted from the Report that
"[t]he presence of extremist chaplains, contractors or volunteers in the
BOP's correctional facilities can pose a threat to institutional security
are encouraged to
and could implicate national security if inmates
137
States.,
United
the
against
acts
terrorist
commit
The government has been careful to stress, however, that the
not entirely clear the shelves of prison chapel libraries. It
does
SCLP
primarily defends the action on the validity of a previous Supreme Court
decision that allowed the restriction of reading materials in certain
other ways.138
contexts, if inmates were allowed to receive them in
can modify the interpretation of their own laws, after all) and a number of states
have passed so-called mini-RFRAs, applying the rule to the laws of their own state.
It seems, however, that in light of the decision in Cutter and the specificity and
applicability of RLUIPA to the current context of the prison setting and protections
of religious expression, that the Petitioners would have a more obvious and powerful
medium through which to challenge this regulation.
136. Associated Press, N.Y Prisoners Sue After Books Pulled From Chapel

Library (June 11, 2007), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=18659
(quoting from Inspector General's Report).
137. Inspector General's Report, supra note 6, at 41 (alteration added).
138. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 551-52 (1979) (noting that the restriction
allows soft-bound books and magazines in addition to access to a large inmate
library).
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Feldman pointed out that inmates were permitted to order books on their
own and bypass the chapel libraries altogether. In defending the
publishers-only rule set forth in Wolfish, the BOP argues that the
publishers-only rule was constitutional because the prison had "a
'relatively large' library for use by inmates, which mitigates any possible
harshness of the [publishers-only] rule."' 3 9 In light of the fact that Court
precedent normally supports restrictions of First Amendment rights in
the prison context, especially when alternatives are available, the
government made no mistake in emphasizing other ways for inmates to
obtain these materials. By leaving this alternate avenue open, the
government essentially argues this restriction is a narrowly tailored
security concern that meets the requirements of the four factor analysis
40
under Turner.1
In addressing this facet of one of BOP's main assertions, the
inmates point out that chapel libraries are a significant, if not exclusive,
14 1
resource for inmates to access meaningful religious books and media.
The chapel libraries hold critical sources of information that allow
inmates to practice their religions not otherwise available in the general
prison library, and because of already tough restrictions on inmates'
ability to receive, purchase, and maintain religious materials from other
sources. If it is in fact true that prison general libraries are virtually
devoid of religious materials, it would be a strong counterpoint to the
government's use of Wolfish. Further, the petitioners allege that the costs
of purchasing books are prohibitive for most inmates, which is a specific
challenge to the validity of the publishers-only rule. 142 Along these same

139. Brief for the Petitioners at 67, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (No.
77-1829) (alteration added).
140. This Note acknowledges the fact that under pressure from members of
Congress and civil liberties activists, the BOP decided in late September to return
religious materials that had been purged from prison chapel libraries. However, the
BOP has not abandoned the initiative completely. Rather, while the "approved" lists
are being compiled, the religious materials would remain on the shelves. BOP
declined to elaborate on how the re-stocking of the prison libraries is progressing. It
said the effort "is beginning immediately," but would not say when it would be
completed, which titles are being kept off the shelves, or the specific criteria being
used in such decisions.
141. Complaint at 7, Milstein et al v. Federal Bureau of Prisons et al, No. 07CV7434 (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 21, 2007).
142. Id. at 8.
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lines, while some BOP institutions were repeatedly instructed to remove
of and dispose of all religious materials not on the approved list, many
them, making access to religious materials
others have already destroyed
1 43
effectively impossible.

Assuming arguendo that inmates have no access to religious
materials from chapel libraries and cannot afford to purchase them using
their own resources, the mandate of the BOP Program Statement on
144 Some
Religious Beliefs and Practices seems to be an empty shell.
courts, applying RLUIPA even before Cutter, have rejected prison
administrators' arguments that focus on the need to curb access to
145 In
religious literature solely on the grounds of safety and security.
146
Marria v. Broaddus, a district court in New York declined to accept
prison officials' contention that the prisoners posed a threat to prison
security and therefore, limitations on their access to religious literature
and assembly were justified. The plaintiff in Marria was a practicing
member of the Nation of Gods and Earths, also known as the Five
Percenters. 147 Under New York Department of Correctional Services
policy, the148 plaintiff was forbidden from receiving his religion's
The court, while acknowledging the fact that the Five
newspaper.
Percenters was a potential security threat, ruled in favor of the plaintiff
under RLUIPA. 149 With facts so specifically similar to the Milstein case,
143. Id. at 11.
144. Id. at 11.
145. See Borzch v. Frank, 340 F. Supp. 2d 955, 968 (W.D. Wis. 2004) (finding
that a prison's policy of forbidding plaintiffs Odinist literature constituted a
substantial burden under RLUIPA); Goodman v. Snyder, No. 00-C-0948, 2003 WL
715650 at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2003) (finding that prisoners' rights were
substantially burdened by a ban on Asatru religious runes).
146. 200 F. Supp. 2d 280, 293-97 (2002).
147. Marria v. Broaddus, 200 F. Supp. 2d 280, 284 (2002). The Prison
provided evidence that inmates identified as 'Five Percenters' have been associated
with instances of violence and disruption and that the term 'Five Percenters' may
somewhat uniquely connote both a religion and a gang in the New York State prison
system.
148. See id. at 282 (noting that inmate did not become a member of the faith
until after incarceration).
149. See id. at 298 (finding that the court denied summary judgment to the
Department of Corrections because a question exists as to whether the ban on the
Five Percenters' literature is reasonably related to the Department's security
interests).
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certainly the right to access a religious newspaper will lead the way to
the Court protecting access to religious texts that facilitate the learning
and practicing of various faiths.
The BOP's recent decision to put religious books back on the
shelves, pending the completion of the final "approved list," probably
means one of two things. It could mean that the BOP is merely bending
to widespread outrage coming generally from the public, or specifically
from Christian-evangelical groups. The situation became more
pronounced when several members of Congress, conservative pundits,
and leaders of the "Religious Right" began a media blitz against the
BOP. Or, perhaps more plausibly, it could signal the Bureau's own
recognition that another approach is necessary to avoid a challenge to its
broadly construed regulation of reading material squarely focused on
religious grounds. Given Supreme Court jurisprudence under RLUIPA
and prison regulation of religious expression, the BOP is most likely
acting under the realization that a more narrowly tailored, less restrictive
measure is necessary to stand against a Free Exercise challenge in the
post-Cutterworld.
CONCLUSION

The denial of religious books and media to prison inmates will
fail under both RLUIPA and Cutter. Even though the petitioners'
decision to file their claims under RFRA was somewhat questionable,
they correctly couched their complaint in terms of a restriction on
religious freedom, likely taking a cue from Cutter. While the government
was careful to emphasize the potential threat to both institutional and
national security, the Court's deference to these justifications will
continue to prove substantially less robust in the realm of religious
expression.
Perhaps the Court best characterized the importance of the
protections of the First Amendment to inmates in holding:
When the prison gates slam behind an inmate, he
does not lose his human quality; his mind does not
become closed to ideas; his intellect does not cease
to feed on a free and open interchange of opinions;
his yearning for self-respect does not end; nor is his
quest for self-realization concluded .... It is the
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role of the First Amendment and this Court to
protect those precious personal rights by which we
satisfy such basic yearnings of the human spirit.150
The Court's decision will depend on how it chooses to interpret
the restriction and what fundamental right it deems regulated. That is not
to say that the framework chosen will make it a foregone conclusion, but
precedent shows it is highly determinative. If the Court does in fact see
this restriction as a free speech issue, under the structure applied in
Banks, it is likely to defer to the BOP's claim that restricting access to
religious books will curb possible incitements of violence in prisons. On
the other hand, if the Court views the SCLP as a broad stroke operating
under the guise of national security to substantially restrict inmates'
religious freedom, Cutter and RLUIPA stand as strong indicators that the
preferred position of religion will overcome.

150. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 428 (1974)
concurring), overruled,Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 104 (1989).

(Marshall,

J.,

